Donation without Domination: Private Charity and Republican Liberty by Taylor, Robert S.
Donation without Domination: Private Charity
and Republican Liberty*
Robert S. Taylor
Political Science, University of California, Davis
ROUGHLY 89 percent of Americans make at least one charitable donationper year, and in a typical year the cash total of these donations exceeds 2
percent of GDP.1 Despite this breadth and depth of private beneficence, however,
contemporary republicans have had a less than charitable attitude towards it,
especially when it is directed to the poor. Consider, for example, Frank Lovett’s
view in his General Theory of Domination and Justice:
Because we do not regard the satisfaction of basic needs below some minimum
level as optional, when unable to satisfy them on our own we become dependent
on the charity of those with the ability to do so for us . . . [B]eing dependent on a
person or group who has the power to arbitrarily withhold goods or services
needed to meet one’s basic needs . . . amounts to domination.”2
Lovett cites Philip Pettit in this passage, whose position is similar:
if I desperately need the help of some particular other or others [for example, “a
rich benefactor”] . . . then I am going to be in a position where I will not
complain against any arbitrary, perhaps petty, forms of interference by such
agents. I’ll be disposed to placate them at any cost, putting myself in the classic
position of the dominated supplicant.3
*For their helpful comments and suggestions, I thank Christian Barry, Henry Curr, Richard
Dagger, Lisa Davies, Chandran Kukathas, Jose Luis Martı, Philip Pettit, Jennifer Rubenstein, Lucas
Swain, two anonymous reviewers, and audiences at the Future of Republicanism Conference in York,
the American Political Science AssociationMeeting in San Francisco, and the Philosophy, Politics, and
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1Sullivan 2002; List 2011, p. 157.
2Lovett 2010, p. 195.
3Pettit 1997, p. 160; also see Sparling 2013, pp. 632–3; Zakaras 2009, p. 9. In On the People’s
Terms, Pettit repeats these claims, but also qualifies them. He begins by arguing that “[r]epublican
theory is bound to reject the idea of forcing the less well off to have to rely . . . on voluntary forms of
philanthropy. The needy will depend on the goodwill of voluntary benefactors for not being exposed
to the interference of those who are in a position to interfere in their lives, which already comes
dangerously close to being dependent on their goodwill in a dominating way.” Shortly thereafter,
though, he adds: “[o]r at least that will be so in the event, surely quite likely, that benefactors are not
pressurized to provide their services or there are not so many benefactors lined up to provide help that
the needy depend on the goodwill of none in particular”; Pettit 2012, p. 113, emphasis added. My
competitive model of public provision will be designed to prevent precisely this kind of particularistic
dependence by ensuring a plurality of private benefactors amongwhom the needy are free to choose.
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As I will discuss in greater detail below, republicans respond to these
purported problems with private charity by proposing an impartial public
provision of support via government welfare programs. They recognize, however,
that such provision may just replace one kind of discretionary power (that of the
“rich benefactor”) with another (that of the welfare bureaucrat), leaving the poor
as vulnerable or even more vulnerable than they were before. They consequently
argue that welfare provision must be made unconditional in order to purge
administrative discretion from the system. Basic-income plans—often
accompanied by demands for their constitutional entrenchment—have for this
reason become a staple of the republican literature.4
So far, so familiar to those conversant with the writings of contemporary
republicans. But is this orthodox republican response to the problem of poverty
the only one available? And if not, might the alternatives prove more attractive?
In this article, I will point out such a “road not taken” by republicans and others
concerned about domination of the poor. In contrast to the administrative model
of public welfare advocated by republican theorists like Pettit and Lovett, in
which the state becomes the dominant provider of aid to the poor via a
constitutionally entrenched unconditional basic income (UBI), I will propose a
competitive model in which the state regulates and subsidizes a decentralized,
non-statist provision of support. Rather than concentrating enormous
discretionary power in the hands of welfare bureaucrats and voters, then valiantly
trying to constrain this power by means of unconditionality and entrenchment,
my approach will advocate a return to a form of private provision that corrects its
historically objectionable features by directing the state to fight collusion among
private charities, supply information to recipients about alternative sources of
aid, and offer substantial grants to charities and/or tax incentives and vouchers to
donors. I will contend that such an approach would do a better job of minimizing
domination of the poor than traditional welfare states, and might be more
politically feasible than a UBI, at least in the near term in certain national
contexts.
I will proceed as follows. In the first section, I will show that whether a
relationship is one of domination is determined primarily by the structure within
which that relationship is embedded. If the structure is economic, as it is with
charity markets, then the competitiveness of the markets in question and the
associated ability of their participants to exit from abusive relationships within
them will determine whether those participants are undominated, that is, free in
the republican sense. In the second section, I present my alternative, competitive
model of public provision, which will superficially resemble decentralized private
charity prior to the rise of the welfare state, but differ from it in important
respects, especially with regard to enhancing competition among providers and
4See, for example, Lovett 2010, pp. 196–203.
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subsidizing those providers either directly (through grants) or indirectly (through
tax subsidies or vouchers for donors). In the third section, I contrast this model
with the standard administrative model of public welfare advocated by
contemporary republicans, pointing out certain advantages it has. I conclude by
drawing some broader lessons for republicanism from these divergent models of
public welfare.
I. POWER AND FREEDOM WITHIN CHARITY MARKETS
I should begin by defining several key terms in the republican lexicon. In his
seminal essay “Freedom as Antipower,” Philip Pettit contends that “one agent
dominates another if and only if he or she has a certain power over that other: in
particular the power to interfere in the affairs of the other and to inflict a certain
damage.”5 More specifically, an agent has power over another whenever three
jointly sufficient conditions are met, viz., when an agent has:
1. the capacity to interfere
2. with impunity and at will
3. in certain choices that the other is in a position to make.6
Liability to the exercise of such power is what republicans mean by the term
“vulnerability,” while immunity from such power, that is, antipower, is the
republican definition of freedom, referred to as “freedom as non-domination”
(hereafter FND).7
I pointed out above that whether a relationship is one of domination is
determined primarily by the structure within which that relationship is
embedded. Why would this be the case? It is the ability to abuse, not actual abuse,
that constitutes domination: as Pettit says, “the grievance I have in mind is that of
having to live at the mercy of another, having to live in a manner that leaves you
vulnerable to some ill that the other is in a position arbitrarily to impose,” and
this kind of vulnerability is wholly consistent with that other rarely or never
engaging in such abuse.8 Thus, when we are trying to evaluate the nature and
extent of domination, we can’t just count up instances of abuse. Instead, we must
assess the structural context of relationships to determine whether they involve
domination, that is, whether certain parties within them possess power over other
parties. By contrast, if parties have the effective (anti)power to counter others’
arbitrary interference through, say, third-party intervention (for example, a
threat of punishment by the state) or a substantive right of exit from the
relationship itself, then these relationships will be free in the republican sense:
FND will be preserved thanks to the structural context within which the
5Pettit 1996, p. 578.
6Ibid., pp. 578, 581.
7Pettit 1997, pp. 5, 122–5, 145.
8Ibid., pp. 4–5.
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relationship is embedded, whether it involves reliable external intervention in the
relationship or a reliable route out of it.
Consider, for example, the marketplace as an economic structure. Markets are
constituted by myriad exchange relationships between buyers and sellers, where
the identities of these buyers and sellers vary according to the category of market
in question: in labor markets, employers and employees, respectively; in product
markets, consumers and producers; and so on. These relationships are mediated
by prices, which establish rates of exchange for participants. How markets
determine these prices has important implications for whether their participants
are dominated or not. To see why, focus for a moment on labor markets. Labor
monopsonists (or, equivalently, well-organized labor-purchasing cartels) will be
impelled by the profit motive to employ fewer workers than they would under
competitive conditions and thereby to generate unemployment: by definition,
unhired workers in monopsonistic labor markets have no other employers to
whom to turn. Those workers fortunate enough to be employed, however, are
placed in a highly precarious, vulnerable position, as they also have no alternative
employers to whom they can turn and are therefore subject to the caprice of the
monopsonist and his managers. This absence of meaningful exit options for
workers makes them liable to arbitrary exercises of economic power, that is,
domination, including the firm’s ability to pay above the profit-maximizing
monopsony wage rate as an act of charity (underwritten by monopsony rents,
ironically) and practice wage discrimination according to morally irrelevant
criteria like race and gender. Other aspects are much darker, as the early history
of industrialization suggests, including sexual exploitation and other forms of
physical abuse (for example, denial of lunch or bathroom breaks, abysmal health
and safety conditions, even beatings). As Pettit has pointed out, workers under
these conditions are indeed “wage slaves,” to useMarxist terminology.9
Contrast such a labor market with a perfectly competitive one, which is
characterized both by a large number of potential employers and employees and by
frictionless exit from employment relationships. Competitive labor markets are
antipower in the precise sense spelled out by Pettit: specifically, participants in such
markets have no capacity to interfere with impunity and at will in the economic
interests of other participants. They have no ability to interfere at will because
market prices are set by the impersonal forces of supply and demand, so there is no
room for discretionary wage setting. Any attempt to deviate from this competitive
price (by, say, underpaying employees) will lead to both the loss of trade and the
punishment of reduced profits; hence, they also have no capacity to interfere with
impunity. Within competitive settings, neither capitalists nor workers are able to
manipulate wages or any other work conditions; as economists would put it, they
are price-takers, not price-makers. Therefore, no firm is in a position to dominate
9Ibid., p. 141; cf. Pettit 2006, p. 142; Pettit 2007, p. 5; also see Nicholson 1995, pp. 724–9; Taylor
2017, pp. 49–51.
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workers. As Pettit himself remarks, “in a well-functioning labor market . . . no one
would depend on any particular master and so no one would be at the mercy of a
master: he or she could move on to employment elsewhere in the event of suffering
arbitrary interference.”10 Competitive markets in general protect the FND of their
participants by eliminating economic power; they create a structural context within
which their constitutive relationships can be free of domination, thereby advancing
republican ideals.11
Let us turn now to charity markets, whose structure roughly parallels that of
labor markets. In place of the employer and employee, we have instead a different
kind of “buyer” and “seller”: the benefactor and the recipient. The donation is the
“price” or “wage” that the benefactor pays to the recipient, in return for which the
benefactor receives certain sorts of benefits, including but not limited to:
1. appreciation from the recipient and praise from third parties, perhaps as part
of a formal or informal system of competitive giving in which such donations
enhance social status,
2. the “warm glow” that may arise from the very act of giving,12
3. the satisfaction of advancing particular principles by giving, including
welfarist ones (such as reducing suffering by meeting the basic needs of the
poor) and republican ones (such as lessening the vulnerability of poor
workers to employers’ domination by the provision of a charitable
“backstop,” a partial and/or temporary alternative to degrading work), and
4. at least under certain charity-market conditions, less admirable motives, like
the pleasures associated with exercising arbitrary power over vulnerable
others or the spiritual blackmail of using charity as a means of pressuring the
poor into particular religious faiths.
Whether benefactor–recipient relationships within charity markets are
characterized by domination (as illustrated by item 4 above) is a function of the
structure of those markets and how it influences “prices” (that is, donations) and
other market attributes. Contra Lovett and Pettit, private charitable relationships
do not necessarily involve dependence and domination: everything hinges on
whether the charity markets within which those relationships are embedded are
(approximately) competitive or not, as we shall see.13
10Pettit 2006, p. 142; cf. Lovett 2010, p. 53: “in a perfectly free market. . .there would theoretically
be no dependency, for all entries and exits would presumably be costless.”
11Factors other than monopsony power may introduce frictions into labor markets, of course. For
example, efficiency-wage theories predict that firms will offer supra-equilibriumwage rates to improve
productivity and reduce turnover, thereby inducing unemployment. Consequently, frictionless exit
from employment relationships is a regulative ideal, one that cannot be achieved in practice, but can
be approximated by policy reforms that enhance worker mobility and thereby reduce opportunities
for domination.
12Andreoni 2006, pp. 1220–3.
13The same could be said of relationships between landlords and tenants in rental markets. See
Stilz (2009, pp. 100–1) for a rental-market example, whose exclusive focus on an impoverished and
otherwise vulnerable tenant obscures the role that rental-market structure plays in ameliorating or
aggravating such vulnerability.
5DONATIONWITHOUT DOMINATION 44
To be sure, when those markets are anti-competitive, the world looks precisely
like the one described by Lovett and Pettit: the “rich benefactors” in such markets
are much like monopsonists in labor markets, able to exercise arbitrary power
over their “dominated supplicants.”14 To see this, imagine a society—one
without a welfare state—divided between a wealthy one or few and an
impoverished many. In such a society, one rich benefactor (or, equivalently, a
well-organized cartel of rich benefactors) can essentially set terms in the charity
marketplace, not only determining the number of recipients and how much they
each receive, but also establishing rules and issuing commands regarding
recipient behavior. This unilateral ability to set terms, combined with the
vulnerability of the recipients, places the benefactors in a position to engage in
“arbitrary, perhaps petty, forms of interference” with the recipients, from
humiliation and sexual exploitation to ideological indoctrination and even the
spiritual blackmail mentioned above.15 Here resides economic power in one of its
most extreme and disturbing forms.
There are Gilded Age examples of societies that bear a remarkable
resemblance to this one, none more famous than Pullman, IL, a company town
built by George Pullman in the early 1880s. In an era of severe working-class
poverty, limited welfare support, and enormous employer power within labor
markets, Pullman effectively offered supra-oligopsony wages to his workers as an
act of charity, delivered in the form of high-quality housing (complete with
indoor plumbing, gas, and superb sanitary conditions), public-health initiatives
(including smallpox vaccination), free public education from kindergarten
through the eighth grade, and a park-like setting of tree-lined streets, landscaped
yards, athletic facilities, and a man-made lake—conditions far surpassing those of
most working-class families at that time. In return, however, Pullman exercised a
minute control over the lives of his resident workers by banning alcohol, carrying
out regular inspections of homes for cleanliness, and strictly limiting not only
expressive rights of speech and press, but also religious freedom: only one church
(owned by Pullman himself) was allowed in town, and the rent on the building
was fixed so high that, apart from a few years of Presbyterian occupancy, it sat
empty. Finally—and most relevantly for our purposes—Pullman excluded
competing charitable organizations from the town, lest they undermine his
tutelary power over his workers. The Pullman community, in short, was a world
of “rich benefactors” and “dominated supplicants,” just the sort of precautionary
model of oligopsonistic private charity anticipated by Lovett and Pettit.16
Charity markets need not be monopsonistic or oligopsonistic in this way,
however. Just as perfectly competitive labor markets are characterized by large
numbers of potential employers and employees and by frictionless exit from
14Pettit 1997, p. 160.
15Ibid.
16Buder 1967.
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employment relationships, so perfectly competitive charity markets are
characterized by large numbers of potential benefactors and recipients and
frictionless exit from charitable relationships. Under these conditions, “prices”
(that is, transfers to the poor) will be set in an impersonal fashion via market
competition, and no participant will be able to dominate another; economic
power will be purged from the system, thus advancing republican liberty. What
makes this FND-friendly result possible is that poor recipients within a
competitive charity market have many patrons from whom to choose, placing
them in a rivalrous relationship with one another and therefore strictly limiting
their power to fix terms. Unlike the Pullman community, which was explicitly
designed to prevent such rivalry from curbing patron power over recipients, a
world of competitive charity markets empowers recipients by forcing patrons to
bid against each other for their clientage.
Such competition among patrons is even consistent with some degree of what
economists call “product differentiation.” For example, patrons might specialize
in regard to client needs (for example, the special requirements of women or the
elderly) and client tastes (for example, religious affiliation of charities in order to
lessen the shame of recipients by means of a sacramental context for accepting
alms).17 Similarly, such patronage could be of a formal or informal type. For
instance, charity markets may consist of a core of organized charity (for example,
church soup kitchens or Habitat for Humanity) circumscribed by a “competitive
fringe” of unorganized charity in the form of irregular, perhaps even unplanned
handouts, with the latter acting as a further disciplining device upon the former.18
This variety and flexibility of private charity provides additional security for
recipients against the possible power of benefactors within charity markets.
The fact that charity markets can be competitive is no guarantee that they will
be, of course. As the Pullman example indicates, patrons may be anxious to keep
clients under their thumbs and may consequently attempt to rig charity markets
in their favor, allowing them to impose draconian terms on recipients and
exercise arbitrary power over them in violation of their republican liberty. In
order to prevent this from happening, state officials will need to maintain
competitive conditions within these charity markets, including but not limited to
legal rights of mobility (geographic exit), full information regarding the kinds and
locations of existing benefactors, and efforts to discourage organized charities
from coordinating over “prices,” eligibility criteria, and so on, because such
coordination might lead to collusion.19 These conditions are in no way “natural”
features of charity markets, so a state policy of laissez-faire toward private
charity is very unlikely to promote FND. Rather, an activist approach of the kind
17Nicholson 1995, pp. 652–7, 659–65, 667–9.
18Viscusi et al. 1992, p. 165.
19Legal rights of mobility do not exist in many societies, both now (e.g., China, with its hukou
system of residency permits) and in the past (e.g., England under the Poor Laws, which similarly
restricted movement of the poor).
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described in the next section must be followed, one that not only secures
competitive conditions but also provides extensive subsidies for charity either
directly (through grants to organized charities) or indirectly (through tax
subsidies or vouchers for donors to such charities). Such a system in fact
constitutes a competitive model of public welfare.
II. A COMPETITIVE MODEL OF PUBLIC WELFARE
Before presenting this model in detail, however, I should first compare and
contrast it with an alternative model with which it might be confused: Herbert
Hoover’s “New Era” model of the associative state. Donald Critchlow and
Charles Parker describe associationalism and its historical background as
follows:
Beginning in the early 1900s, public officials, encouraged and led by reformers,
began to experiment with new government programs on the local, state, and
federal levels . . . Americans developed in the first two decades of the twentieth
century a complex array of welfare agencies for the rehabilitation of the
dependent and the deviant, increasingly overseen by professionalized social
workers who sought to apply the latest scientific and social science research to
the administration of these programs. In the 1920s, Herbert Hoover sought to
rationalize this involvement of private and public welfare activities through an
“associative” state that offered an alternative to Prussian-style bureaucracy or the
British dole. This associative state placed responsibility on private groups and
local communities supported by federal advice and minimal federal funding and
involvement . . . This vision . . . continued to embody a deep belief in traditional
American values of individualism, voluntarism, and local initiative.20
As we shall see, there are important continuities between Hoover’s
associationalism and my own competitive model. First, as Ellis Hawley notes, the
associative state was conceived as a “nonstatist alternative” to both “welfare
statism” and “atomistic individualism,” a sort of Third Way avant la lettre.
Second and relatedly, it offered “a pluralistic proliferation of competing groups”
to deliver charity to the poor rather than state-dominated provision. Lastly, and
most importantly,
[its] central idea was to pull or coax an effective welfare system from the
associative life of the private sector, using the government as a facilitator of this
process . . . [by means of] credit, spending, and tax policies that would support
and supplement these private-sector actions.21
Despite these similarities, however, my competitive model of provision will
diverge from Hoover’s associationalism in two ways, each of which responds to a
different but equally troubling problem with Hoover’s vision. First, my model
20Critchlow and Parker 1998, pp. 5, 7. As John Dempsey and Eric Gruver put it, the associative
state is one “in which businesses cooperate with each other and with government through self-
governing organizations to create ‘desired outcomes for society’”; Dempsey and Gruver 2009, p. 227.
21Hawley 1998, pp. 162–3, 165.
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will reject the disturbing technocratic corporatism of the associative state.
Hoover sought out a “new unifier” for his associative “higher government,” be it
“in a new business leadership, the new technocratic professions, or the new
claimants to social scientific expertise,” so as to provide “permanent managerial
mechanisms [of a] national system” of charitable provision.22 Such a technocratic
elite would “rationalize” the system by fashioning “a nationwide network that
would decrease competition and thereby increase efficiency” in charitable
provision, eliminating wasteful duplication and establishing collective goals and
standards via charity-industry “self-government.”23
This corporatist vision of a disinterested technocratic elite advancing the
common good by means of an industrial self-organization that conquers and
“rationalizes” the supposed anarchy of the marketplace is, of course, the exact
opposite of the kind of competitive charity market sketched earlier. It is, in fact,
the Pullman system writ large, with social workers and social scientists playing
the role of the sleeping-car manufacturer. As I argued above, without vigorous
competition within charity markets, recipients will be vulnerable to abuse and
exploitation by their benefactors. This remains true even when those benefactors
happen to be public-spirited and highly trained experts: again, it is the ability to
abuse, not actual abuse, that constitutes domination, and a technocratic elite
superintending a national system of charitable provision will be well placed to
engage in such abuse if they wish.24 Replacing an already imperfectly competitive
system of private charity with such cartelistic corporatism would be like
performing a swan dive from the proverbial frying pan into the fire.25
The second divergence of my model from Hoover’s associationalism is with
regard to its miserliness. As Hawley notes, “public financing of the effort was to
be minimal,” due in large part to “Hoover’s determination to minimize federal
relief and thus preserve ‘the spiritual impulses in our people for generous giving
and generous service.’”26 The associative state’s tightfistedness, like its
cartelistic–corporatist organization, exacerbated the vulnerability of poor
recipients within not just charity markets but labor markets as well. Within
charity markets, this lack of financing prevented the funding of the sort of
informational campaigns that would have notified recipients of the locations and
available services of different charitable organizations; it also prevented the
government from offering certain services itself, whether to encourage mobility in
impoverished populations (for example, with travel vouchers) or heighten
competition in charity markets with relatively few benefactors. In short, stingy
funding worked hand in glove with corporatism to undermine competitive
22Ibid., pp. 163, 167; also see Dempsey and Gruver 2009, p. 230.
23Dempsey and Gruver 2009, pp. 230, 232.
24Pettit 1997, pp. 4–5.
25This technocratic–corporatist dimension to Hoover’s associationalism calls to mind Michel
Foucault’s discussion of the “disciplinary society,” but with cartel- rather than state-control of the
“mechanisms of discipline”; Foucault 1975, pp. 209–28, here pp. 209, 213.
26Hawley 1998, pp. 166, 172.
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conditions in charity markets, leaving the poor dangerously vulnerable to
oligopsonistic “rich benefactors.” Within monopsonistic and oligopsonistic labor
markets, the lack of a generous and reliable system of charity to serve as an
alternative to employment made workers susceptible to abuse and exploitation
by capitalists and their managers: charitable “fallbacks” place employees in a
stronger bargaining position vis-a-vis their employers, enabling them either to
exit the relationship without the risk of starvation or homelessness or to threaten
to do so; without such meaningful exit options, workers will become liable to
arbitrary exercises of economic power.
These severe flaws in Hoover’s associationalist vision were exposed to public
view during the first years of the Great Depression, leading angry voters to
demand “larger appropriations and more public bureaucracy.”27 What they
understandably failed to see at the time was that these reforms were potentially
separable: more generous public funding could have been combined with a non-
statist, non-bureaucratic welfare system that was genuinely decentralized and
competitive. These twin features are central, in fact, to my own competitive
model. Consider the second feature first. Instead of allowing the state to serve as
the predominant provider of aid to the poor, with all the dangers of abuse that
entails, the competitive model would rely upon pluralistic non-statist provision
within a competitive charity market, with a broad array of benefactors bidding
against each other for the clientage of the poor. The state’s primary job in this
model would be to preserve competition between providers by various means.
First and foremost, antitrust laws would need to be extended to charity markets
to foil the kind of coordination and collusion over “prices,” services offered,
eligibility criteria, and so on, that charitable providers may pursue in the names of
both effectiveness and efficiency; such industrial self-government a la Hoover
makes domination of the poor within charity markets more likely. Although
antitrust laws already apply to the nonprofit sector and have frequently been used
against professional associations, hospitals, and educational institutions, they
have yet to be applied to charity markets; how the courts would respond to such
cases—for example, a case in which a local group of soup kitchens consolidated
operations in order to save money and achieve economies of scale, gaining
substantial market power over their clients—is at this point speculative.28
Nonetheless, in order to prevent Pullman-like results, antitrust authorities would
need to watch charity markets carefully, as in the absence of a traditional welfare
state the private sector will be the principal provider of aid and therefore a
possible site of domination and exploitation.
It will not be the sole provider of aid, however, because that would be unlikely
to maximize the competitiveness of the charity market; in my model, the state is
tasked with offering additional services beyond that of antitrust enforcement.
27Ibid., p. 168.
28Searing 2014, pp. 282–3.
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First, the state has to provide complete information on the locations, eligibility
criteria, and available services of different charitable organizations to potential
recipients. Client ignorance would hinder mobility among competing patrons,
increasing their market power and making the poor more vulnerable; and patrons
themselves, though perhaps interested in advertising their own wares, are
unlikely to be adequately motivated to provide easy-to-digest, side-by-side
comparisons with their competitors. Their clients are even less likely to be in a
position to collect, organize, and disseminate such information due to their very
poverty and marginalization. Secondly, in cases where antitrust action and
information provision are insufficient to make local charity markets competitive,
the state must either help the poor move to markets that are more competitive
(via travel and relocation vouchers) or act as a provider of last resort in these
monopsonistic or oligopsonistic charity markets, thereby injecting some much-
needed competition into them. Such “public options,” designed to widen choice
and discipline private providers, have already played a role in debates on health
care and education and could play a similar role in this context.29 What is
essential in such cases, however, is that this last-resort state provider remain
simply one provider among many, without any special privileges or ambitions to
corner the market, because displacing most private providers would only
undermine competition and thus exacerbate the poor’s vulnerability—a point to
which I will return in the next section.
So far, the competitive model might appear to be one of private rather than
public welfare, with the state’s role being restricted to charity-market regulation,
information dissemination, and service provision in extremis. I must therefore
return to the first feature mentioned above: generous public funding. First,
however, we should ask why public funding would be necessary at all, apart from
the limited and contingent services just discussed. Wouldn’t private donations be
sufficient to fund a decentralized and competitive welfare system?
Earlier, I listed some of the benefits that benefactors received in return for their
donations, such as the satisfaction of advancing particular principles by giving,
including but not limited to welfarist ones (decreasing suffering by meeting the
poor’s basic needs) and republican ones (minimizing the poor’s vulnerability to
domination in charity and labor markets). Such altruistic motivations convert
what might otherwise be a private good into a public good: if a benefactor is truly
motivated by a recipient’s overall welfare or FND and not just by their own
private contribution to it (as would be the case with warm-glow or status-
competition giving), then donations will generate potentially large positive
externalities for (similarly motivated) others; this creates incentives for “free
riding” on the welfare-enhancing or domination-reducing efforts of other donors,
however, and suggests that even in a competitive charity market, equilibrium
29See, for example, Halpin and Harbage 2010;Mill 1998, pp. 117–18.
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donations will be Pareto suboptimal.30 Were the positive externalities in question
trivial ones (for example, the spillover benefits associated with pleasant smiles or
colorful front-yard gardens), their suboptimal provision would probably not be a
matter for state concern. Here, by contrast, what is at stake is the protection of
our society’s most vulnerable members from arbitrary power within multiple
market settings—hardly a trivial matter. This strongly suggests that the state, in
addition to its antitrust, informational, and “public-option” roles, can and
should take whatever actions are needed to raise donations to their optimal
level.31
The most obvious and least invasive strategy for doing so is via substantial
state subsidies. Broadly speaking, these subsidies might take two non-mutually-
exclusive forms: direct subsidies to private charity providers or indirect subsidies
to these providers by way of either tax breaks or vouchers given to their private
donors.32 I am agnostic as to the proper mix of these policy tools, though I would
be surprised if a corner solution (that is, all one or all the other) were optimal.
The best mix will normally vary depending upon context. One thing we can say is
that each has its own strengths and weaknesses. Direct subsidies to private
charities could be allocated by either a body of experts given substantial
discretion or a bureaucracy given little or no discretion but rather guided by a set
of outcome-based rules (for example, success measures like health or educational
outcomes for the poor or transitions out of poverty itself). Expert allocation
would have the great advantage of flexibility, but would also be susceptible to
“capture,” whether by the private charities they are charged with subsidizing or
by the experts themselves (social workers, social scientists, and so on), who might
have various kinds of private agendas.33 Bureaucratic allocation, on the other
hand, would be less flexible, but also less susceptible to capture; moreover, its
allocation rules could be designed by experts. Indirect subsidies, being highly
decentralized and dependent upon the donation decisions of myriad donors,
would be least susceptible to capture, but also least likely to be guided by expert
judgment of any kind. Given all of this, the most we can do—at least while
operating at this level of abstraction—is make certain comparative claims: for
30Hochman and Rodgers 1969.
31The question of what level is optimal is hard to answer. In principle, the economic literature on
public goods provides solutions (e.g., the Groves–Ledyard mechanism for public-goods preference
revelation), but the proposed mechanisms are extremely difficult to implement. As a practical matter,
the best approach may just be trial and error: use different levels and configurations of subsidies, track
the incomes of the poor, and make adjustments to bring them towards the poverty line, which is
something we might be able to reach a political consensus on. We would probably want to start the
subsidies on the high side and adjust them downwards as necessary, given what is at stake for the poor
themselves.
32These donors could be individuals, businesses, NGOs, etc. For present purposes, I will regard
them as individuals. I should also note that, as John List points out, “the marginal cost (forgone tax
revenues) [of tax breaks for charitable gifts] is less than the marginal benefit (increased dollars of
giving) . . . if giving is price elastic,” and the best evidence suggests that it is elastic, especially for the
rich; List 2011, pp. 170–2; cf. Andreoni 2006, pp. 1230–40.
33Stigler 1975, ch. 8.
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example, the more probable that capture is (due to political culture or
institutions, say), ceteris paribus, the more attractive indirect subsidies and
perhaps bureaucratic allocation of direct subsidies will be.34
Two sorts of objections to this kind of competitive model are likely to arise, one
related to the allocation of support to recipients, the other to the profile of
contributions by donors. Regarding the first, some may worry that a decentralized
system of support by a host of private providers will allow certain classes of
individuals or regions of the country to be neglected, whether accidentally or by
design (for example, a systematic refusal to aid sex offenders). The very pluralism of
the competitive model makes extreme forms of such neglect unlikely—it would be a
rare class or region that could find no willing providers—but the resulting
distribution of assistance is also unlikely to track need in any systematic way,
especially when indirect subsidies are heavily used. This fact may militate in favor of
expert-guided and/or bureaucrat-implemented direct-subsidy systems. Alternatively,
if we decide for other reasons (for example, concerns about capture) to stick with a
primarily indirect-subsidy system, we could impose non-discrimination rules on
private providers and use public options more aggressively in order to ensure that
certain disfavored classes and regions do not fall between the system’s cracks.
Regarding the second sort of objection, some may be concerned about the
disproportionate role the wealthy might play in my competitive model, a concern
that is already being raised about existing philanthropy in America.35 Direct-
subsidy schemes are less vulnerable to this objection—though they only avoid it,
perhaps, by replacing economic elites with techno-bureaucratic elites, leaving
various constituencies unrepresented or underrepresented in the design and
management of the system. Indirect-subsidy systems would seem to be especially
vulnerable, but much hinges on how they are designed. Those relying heavily
upon tax breaks are likely to intensify the influence of the wealthy and might be
problematic for this reason. A system using generous donation vouchers that
scale inversely with income, on the other hand, could do much to democratize
contributions to (and therefore influence over) charitable providers.36
34This policy question of what mix of direct versus indirect subsidies to use arises in other policy
contexts as well. For example, in deciding how to encourage technological innovation, the state must
choose a mix of direct subsidies (e.g., NSF grants) allocated by experts and indirect ones (e.g., patents)
whose allocation is effectively decentralized. In school-choice systems, the state must also pick a mix
of direct subsidies (e.g., subsidies to charter schools) allocated in part by experts or rule-bound
bureaucrats and indirect ones (e.g., educational vouchers) allocated by parents.
35See, for example, Callahan 2017; Gelles 2017.
36Another potential objection regarding contributions is that government subsidies to religiously
affiliated charitable providers may lead to objectionable levels or types of entanglement and even
endorsement, violating the establishment clause of the US First Amendment. This is more of a worry
for direct-subsidy systems than for indirect-subsidy ones, especially in the aftermath of Zelman v.
Simmons-Harris (2002), a US Supreme Court case finding an educational-voucher system that
included religious schools consistent with the First Amendment on the grounds that the subsidies were
freely directed to religious schools by parents, not the state, and that the program was therefore
properly neutral between religious and non-religious schools. All else equal, this makes indirect
subsidies lookmore attractive.
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Now that my competitive model has been described in greater detail, we can
see that it is, in fact, rightly called a model of public welfare: beneficence is
ostensibly private within it, carried out by “a pluralistic proliferation of
competing groups” rather than the state, but the entire charity market is both
superintended and heavily subsidized by the state, be it directly or indirectly.37
This system returns to the decentralized and non-statist charity of the past, while
also guaranteeing the kind of competitive and adequate provision demanded by
republican principles. Like Hoover’s associative state, my model aims “to pull or
coax an effective welfare system from the associative life of the private sector,”
with the government facilitating through “credit, spending, and tax policies that
would support and supplement these private-sector actions.”38 Unlike the
associative state, however, this model rejects technocratic corporatism and
includes a generous system of state funding in order to best promote FND for the
poor. Although “Hoover Improved” might not strike you as the world’s most
promising slogan, I will show in the next section that this model can do a better
job of minimizing domination of the poor than traditional welfare states and may
prove more politically feasible than a UBI, at least in the near term in certain
national contexts.39
III. THE COMPETITIVE MODEL VERSUS THE ADMINISTRATIVE
MODEL OF PUBLIC WELFARE
As I noted in the introduction, the orthodox republican response to anti-
competitive charity markets composed of “rich benefactors” and “dominated
supplicants” has been an administrative model, not a competitive one: namely,
the impartial public provision of welfare by way of state assistance programs.40 A
disturbing trait of such programs, however—especially for a prioritarian
republicanism that stresses the security of the most vulnerable citizens—is the
kind of discretionary power that they place in the hands of welfare
administrators.41 Virtually all state redistribution is conditional, be it on
37Hawley 1998, p. 163.
38Ibid., pp. 162, 165.
39I have made frequent historical comparisons in this section between my competitive model and
Hoover’s associative state, but there is another, less obvious historical comparison that I could make
between my model and certain elements of Lyndon B. Johnson’s Great Society. Consider, for example,
the Community Action Program (CAP), established by the 1964 Economic Opportunity Act, which
ultimately created over 1,000 Community Action Agencies (CAA) around the country to administer
various programs (e.g., Head Start) funded by federal, state, and local grants. These CAAs were
managed by boards of directors initially drawn from the recipient populations and residents of the
targeted neighborhoods; Bailey and Duquette 2015; Hall 1992. Thus, the CAP was both decentralized
and democratized, and consequently similar to the indirect-subsidy version of my competitive model
with inversely-income-scaled donation vouchers. One key difference, however, is that the CAAs were
administrative agencies rather than catalysts for charity-market competition: their object was local
and responsive supervision, not any sort of guarantee that recipients would be free to choose among
diverse, competing suppliers of aid. As decentralized and democratic as it was, the CAP still
fundamentally embodied the administrative, not the competitive, model of public welfare.
40Pettit 1997, p. 160.
41Lovett 2010, p. 201; Pettit 2012, pp. 89–90.
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educational enrolment (for example, job retraining), looking for work, work
itself (for example, the Earned Income Tax Credit or workfare), or other policy
objectives (for example, immunizing and educating girls, as with conditional cash
transfers in Latin America).42 Verifying that poor clients meet these conditions
requires that discretionary power be given to welfare agents, both to determine
whether the conditions are being met (assessment, including investigatory powers
of various sorts) and to withdraw aid if they fail to be met (redress). Certain
limitations can be put on these powers, such as rights of appeal to quasi-judicial
bodies if and when benefits are cut, but there will remain an ineliminable degree
of bureaucratic discretion that can and almost inevitably will be used for non-
public purposes, be they financial (for example, bribery), tribal (for example,
protecting the bureaucratic-class interests of welfare officials), or ideological (for
example, punishing or “liberating” the poor, depending on the official’s political
views).
This problem of discretionary administrative power over clients is only made
worse by the state’s dominant position in the charity market. Such dominance is
guaranteed not only by its size and scope, but also by the fact that public welfare
tends to “crowd out” private charity, eliminating much of the government’s
competition.43 Although warm-glow and status-competition giving keeps the
crowd-out from becoming complete—state support for the poor cannot fully
substitute for private donors’ support if their motivation is in part non-altruistic,
as it generally is—there is broad empirical evidence that it has been and continues
to be substantial. For example, Richard Cloward and Irwin Epstein discovered
“disengagement from the poor” by private social-welfare organizations (for
example, family adjustment agencies) in the aftermath of the New Deal; these
organizations “moved towards a new clientele, economically more fortunate than
the old,” rather than “defining a new role with respect to its traditional clientele,
the poor”—a classic case of crowd-out.44 More recent experimental and
observational data has shown rates of crowding-out of private charity ranging
from 50 percent to 73 percent: for every dollar of state spending, private spending
falls 50 to 73 cents.45 From the point of view of the aid recipient, this net gain
represents a mixed blessing: overall support increases, but becomes ever more
concentrated in government hands.
42The Economist 2013. Another kind of conditionality is that associated with diverse forms of
social insurance, the payouts from which are triggered by accidents of various kinds (e.g.,
unemployment, illnesses, natural disasters, bank failures, etc.). Pettit sees such insurance programs as
safeguards against domination (2012, pp. 112–14), but they are best suited to rectify what Rawls
termed “fortuitous contingencies” (i.e., “good or ill fortune . . . over the course of a life”), rather than
“natural and social contingencies” (i.e., the birth lottery, both with regard to “native endowments”
and the “social class of origin”); Rawls 2001, p. 55. A UBI or some other variety of public welfare is
needed to minimize the vulnerability associated with being among the least advantaged in the birth
lottery, which will partly insure against fortuitous contingencies as well.
43Andreoni 2006, pp. 1215–24, 1260–4.
44Cloward and Epstein 1965, pp. 623–6.
45See Andreoni 1993; Andreoni and Payne 2011; Payne 1998.
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State domination of the charity market, combined with benefit conditionality,
gives welfare officials a kind of arbitrary power over recipients that private
benefactors rarely have. This makes the administrative model appear especially
unattractive when compared to the competitive model which, by maintaining
decentralization and non-collusion, restricts the discretion of private charities:
clients who feel that they are being abused and exploited have countless other
options—including the state itself in extremis, but just as one provider among
others. The worry with the administrative model as described so far is that it
merely replaces one species of discretionary power (that of the “rich benefactor”)
with another (that of the welfare administrator), leaving the poor as vulnerable or
even more vulnerable than they were before.
To their credit, republicans are well aware that benefit conditionality and its
accompanying bureaucratic discretion can compromise the poor’s FND—even
when the condition in question is just a means test (that is, an income-based
eligibility rule). As Frank Lovett acknowledges:
It is doubtful whether means testing can be carried out in a suitably non-
arbitrary manner: practical experience suggests that state welfare agencies must
inevitably employ extensive bureaucratic discretion in carrying out such policies,
and that the particular vulnerability of persons in need of public assistance
renders the usual sorts of constraints on such discretion more or less ineffective.
From a domination-minimizing point of view, it will not do to replace the
arbitrary charity of private individuals and groups with the arbitrary charity of
state welfare agencies, for this would merely substitute one form of domination
for another.46
Both he and Pettit have therefore advocated a UBI, which would dispense with
the need for such bureaucratic discretion.47
The UBI version of the administrative model has a series of interrelated
advantages over not just traditional welfare states, but also the competitive model
presented in the last section. The first is administrative simplicity: given the
absence of conditionality, no eligibility criteria need to be assessed by
bureaucrats, meaning that relatively few of them will be required to administer
the program. Traditional welfare states are by contrast administratively complex,
as they encompass a wide array of separate programs with different eligibility
criteria, and even the competitive model will need an associated bureaucracy to
verify, for example, that private charities receiving state grants or tax-subsidized
donations are at least semi-competent dispensers of services to the poor rather
than front organizations for con artists. The second, closely related advantage is
transparency: each UBI annual check will be the same and should be equal to the
UBI budget, less administrative overhead, divided by the population size, which
will make monitoring much easier. Traditional welfare states are opaque by
46Lovett 2010, pp. 198–9; cf. Pettit 1997, p. 162.
47Lovett 2010, pp. 199–203; Pettit 2007.
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comparison because of their administrative complexity, and the competitive
model similarly so, though its complexity will depend upon the mix of subsidies
offered (expert-allocated direct versus bureaucratic-allocated direct versus
indirect). Finally, UBI transparency will surely diminish opportunities for
corruption relative to its two competitors.
The greatest comparative disadvantage of the UBI, though, is its expense,
which calls into question its political feasibility in several ways. Even a modest
UBI will be costly due to its very unconditionality: unlike traditional welfare
states or the competitive model, the UBI subsidizes all equally—rich, poor, and
middle class—and this lack of targeting will usually necessitate large tax
increases, even after taking into account compensating reductions in other
entitlement programs. For example, imagine that all public social expenditures in
the US (excluding health care) were converted into a UBI: this would have yielded
about $5,600 per person in 2013, which is not even halfway to that year’s poverty
threshold of about $12,000 for a single person under age 65, so reaching it would
have required the US to more than double its non-health public social
expenditures—a rather challenging political task, to put it mildly.48 UBI
supporters have at times circulated (much) smaller figures, but they do not stand
up to careful scrutiny; consequently, the OECD’s own conclusions continue to
hold: “large additional tax revenues . . . would be required” to support a
sufficiently generous UBI.49
The political track record of UBIs has not been impressive: the Swiss rejected a
generous UBI plan in a referendum on June 5, 2016, with 77 percent voting
against; some UBI experiments have been performed in the past (for example, the
Canadian province of Manitoba during the 1970s), and several more are planned
in the near future (for example, a Finnish government experiment in which some
48OECD 2017a; DeNavas-Walt and Proctor 2014, p. 43. To arrive at this UBI estimate, go to the
OECD (2017a) interactive data set for social expenditures (SOCX), set the “Measure” selector to “per
head, at current prices and PPPs, in U.S. dollars,” and change the “Branch” selector from “Total” to
“Health” and subtract the 2013 figures. A more general formula for calculating the cost of a UBI is
provided by James Tobin (1970, p. 265): a UBI pegged at X% of average income would require an
increase in the average income-tax rate of X percentage points. So if the tax rate is already at 20% in
order to cover usual government expenditures, then a UBI pegged at 60% of average income—a
common poverty-line measure in Europe—would require an average income-tax rate of 80%, which is
unsustainably high. Finally, I should note that some supporters of the UBI concede that the “highest
sustainable level” of a UBI may not be anywhere near the poverty line and may therefore fail to meet
basic needs (e.g., Lovett 2010, pp. 200, 202–3; van Parijs 1998, p. 2). I believe they have made their
peace with this limitation of the UBI only because they think the traditional welfare state is the sole
alternative; my article identifies a ThirdWay.
49OECD 2017b, p. 8. For example, the following UBI estimates from Karl Widerquist have been
widely circulated in the media: “the net cost of a roughly poverty-level UBI ($12,000 per adult, $6,000
per child) with a 50% marginal tax rate is $539 billion per year” (Widerquist 2017, p. 4; emphasis
added). The Widerquist plan, though, is partly financed by applying this 50%marginal tax rate to the
plan’s net beneficiaries (i.e., the poor and working classes). Looking at Line 12 of Table 3, we see that
the poor and working classes end up paying for over 60% of the cost of their own UBIs (p. 13). If this
cost were covered instead by the net contributors (i.e., the middle and upper classes), the plan’s cost
would be a less reasonable $1.375 trillion, almost 40% of the US federal budget (Congressional
Budget Office 2014).
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citizens receive a UBI of $900 per month, and a privately financed experiment in
Oakland, CA, offering a UBI of $1000–$2000 per month), but no state-financed
UBIs have yet come to fruition on a large scale, despite centuries of endorsements
going back as far as Condorcet and Paine.50 Moreover, even if a generous UBI
were implemented on a large scale, it would suffer from political risk, which is
itself a kind of vulnerability for poor recipients: van Parijs may be unmoved by
the prospect of a sinecured class of “permanent tramps” or vagrant surfers, but
there is no guarantee that voters would have the same tolerant attitude upon
seeing the long-term results, perhaps prompting them to reimpose conditions.51
Again to their credit, republicans are aware of this risk and have therefore
suggested constitutional entrenchment of such benefits so as to protect them from
“the whim of an electoral or parliamentary majority,” but this would lift the
political bar even higher, demanding in many cases a supermajority of voters to
implement—or perhaps an exceptionally activist set of supreme-court justices.52
None of this is meant to suggest that a substantial UBI is politically impossible.
In countries with the world’s largest social-welfare budgets, for example, a
generous UBI could be funded with no additional taxes: if all public social
expenditures (excluding health care) in Denmark, Finland, France, Norway, and
Sweden were converted into UBIs, they would provide in the range of $9000–
$11,000 annually for every citizen.53 For better or for worse, however, the world
is not Scandinavia writ large, which raises an important question: if a sufficiently
generous UBI turns out to be politically infeasible at any given time or place, then
to which alternative welfare system should republicans turn?
On the basis of what has been said so far, I think the answer is clear: the
competitive model of public welfare, which (like Hoover’s associative state
before it) offers us a Third Way, uniting some of the best features of the two
administrative models. Like the traditional welfare state, it targets the poor and is
therefore more affordable than a generous UBI—a plus in the tax-averse countries
of the Anglosphere. Like the UBI, but unlike the traditional welfare state, it can
markedly reduce domination of the poor in both charity and labor markets, but
by a different means than the UBI: instead of relying upon unconditionality and
constitutional entrenchment, it harnesses competitive and liberally subsidized
charity markets in the service of republican liberty. I remain agnostic about
whether the competitive model of public welfare is really superior to a UBI, all
things considered—this judgment hinges on a host of difficult and contested
50The Economist 2016.
51Van Parijs 2006, pp. 13–14.
52Pettit 1997, p. 162. One other difficulty with a generous UBI from a republican perspective is its
probable effect on immigration policy. An open-borders or even liberal immigration regime, when
combined with such a UBI, would run a large risk of fiscal insolvency. The two obvious alternatives
are unattractive from a republican point of view: either a system of second-class citizenship without
welfare benefits for foreign workers or a highly restrictive immigration regime, which would expose
illegal and legal immigrants to an exceptionally brutal form of arbitrary power; Abizadeh 2008.
53OECD 2017a.
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empirical considerations—but I believe either is preferable to a traditional
welfare state, and this conclusion has vital implications for republican welfare
policy in the second-best world we inhabit.
This being said, I want to end the section on a cautionary note. Suppose that
the competitive model is more politically feasible than a UBI in the near term, but
also less effective at minimizing domination of the poor, such that—political
feasibility aside—republicans would prefer a UBI. In this case, as A. John
Simmons puts it, “we are left to simply weigh intuitively the various desiderata as
best we can,” though being much more feasible in certain national contexts (as I
think is true in the US, for example) tilts the balance in favor of the competitive
model.54 Maybe this is only true in isolation, however. There might be a sense in
which the competitive model is a serious improvement upon the traditional
welfare state in terms of minimizing domination, but because the latter is also an
administrative model—albeit one that is much inferior to the UBI version—it may
lie on a more feasible path to the ultimate UBI ideal. That path might involve
many slow, internal reforms that gradually reduced bureaucratic discretion by
improving appeals procedures for poor recipients and introducing small UBIs that
are scaled up over time, all of which could be catalyzed by NGO advocacy and
legislative action. To use an analogy originally used by Amartya Sen and adopted
by Simmons: even if the competitive model is a K2 next to the UBI’s Mount
Everest, this does not necessarily mean that our most feasible path to Mount
Everest summits K2 instead of the much lower peak of the traditional welfare
state. This possibility suggests the need for additional work on the relative
desirability of the competitive model and the UBI.55
IV. CONCLUSION
Republicans are rightly suspicious of private beneficence in uncompetitive charity
markets consisting of “rich benefactors” and “dominated supplicants.”56 As I
have argued, however, we can exorcise the ghost of George Pullman without
turning to an administrative model of public welfare. The competitive model
offers us a non-statist, non-bureaucratic system of support for the poor that
avoids the damaging errors of Hoover’s associative state by being decentralized,
non-collusive, and unstinting. Whether this competitive model is better than the
UBI at minimizing domination of the poor remains an open question, but two
things at least are fairly clear: first, the competitive model performs better than
the traditional welfare state along this dimension because it replaces
administrative discretion with the discipline of charity-market competition;
second, a generous UBI will stay politically infeasible in a non-trivial number of
countries (especially those of the Anglosphere) in the near term, because of its
54Simmons 2010, p. 19.
55Ibid., p. 35.
56Pettit 1997, p. 160.
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vast expense. These considerations suggest that the competitive model might be
the best feasible strategy for advancing republican liberty in some national
contexts, at least for the time being. If so, then republicans ought to reconsider
their nearly exclusive focus on the UBI as an anti-poverty measure. One size does
not always fit all.
I should close by acknowledging that some republicans might be wary of a
model of public welfare that looks “neoliberal” in character because it seems “to
‘desacralize’ institutions that had formerly been protected from the forces of
private market competition.”57 I also understand that some features of the
competitive model—for example, the relative unpredictability and even obscurity
of distributive patterns that will emerge in the essentially unplanned order of a
vibrant charity market—could concern those who value the transparency and
common currency of a UBI. These are reasonable worries, ones that may militate
in favor of a greater role for particular features of the model (for example, the
public option) that I have perhaps underemphasized. On the other hand, part of
the purpose of this article has been to persuade republicans that a progressive
politics does not have to be pursued by administrative means, that the impersonal
order of the marketplace can, at least in certain cases, substitute for the
impersonal order of a Weberian bureaucracy. I hope that, instead of seeing my
argument for the competitive model as a reductio of republicanism, they see it,
rather, for what it was intended to be: a call for more openness among
republicans with respect to matters of institutional design. As Lovett and Pettit
themselves have observed, republicanism is “a research program, not a
comprehensive blueprint or ideology.”58 If so, then the comparatively market-
friendly approach adopted here can surely play a role within it.
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